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ARMAMENT MODERNIZATION IN SOUTH 
AMERICA: EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL 




Almost all theoretical production that has somehow dealt with the 
South American security system is unanimous in observing two aspects: first, 
the scarce existence of military conflicts between its states – the last substan-
tive war in South America was the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay). 
Redemocratization, which begun in the 1980s, is seen as the key variable to 
explain the transformation of the region’s relations into something close to a 
security community (Hurrel 1998) or of a “long peace” (Kacowicz 2005). The 
second aspect is the emergence of two different security subsystems. On the 
one hand, that of the Andean countries, with issues related to drug traffick-
ing, the existence of non-state armed groups and of intra-state armed con-
flicts, and in Colombia and Peru´s case unresolved territorial disputes and the 
existence of States with traditional miltitary behavior. On the other hand, the 
subsystem in the Southern Cone, which often is identified in the literature as 
a security community2.
 This differentiation of security subsystems has contributed much to 
fueling the argument of a dual outlook of South America, in which even per-
spectives influenced by critical theory, such as Ruth Diamint’s, have noted by 
highlighting the relationships between the military, civilians and security in 
1  Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of São Paulo (USP). Doctor 
in Political Science by USP, holds a postdoctoral degree in Political Science from Columbia 
University.  E-mail: rafaelvi@usp.br
2 Karl Deutsch defined the security community (pluralist) as “a transnational region in which 
two societies have expectations that conflicts between states will not be settled through the use 
of force” because those states form a security community (Deutsch 1957). 
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South America “[...] civil-military relations are reconverted at two different 
speeds: in the Southern Cone, despite the various difficulties, there is a he-
gemonic recovery, while in the Andean countries there is a deep crisis of state 
institutions”. (Diamint, 2001, p. 24).
This article stresses these theses in order to show: first, that contem-
porary developments and concerns about the purchase of sophisticated weap-
onry by South American countries, especially Chile, Venezuela and Brazil, 
in the first two decades of this century are a critical point for the idea of  a 
permanent (democratic) peace zone in the region. Critical moments in South 
America are not wars, because of their absence, but the times when an arms 
build-up is operated. Second, the arms build-up questions the rigidity of the 
dual vision with two safety subsystems. In fact, arms purchases transform the 
region into a single regional security complex, since it is operated not only 
in the Andean system and in the Southern Cone, but by countries from both 
subregions.
Methodologically, aggregate military investments of the countries of 
the region at the beginning of the millennium are taken as an empirical basis 
to try to demonstrate the tensions of theses based both on security communi-
ty perspectives and on dualistic analysis, and to show the new political goals 
of countries such as Brazil, Chile and Venezuela –  taking into account me-
dium-term trends that began to consolidate in the period 2003-2007, when 
the South American region underwent a vigorous economic expansion. The 
article is divided into four parts: the first presents what I call dualistic theses; 
in the second part, the empirical developments of the South American arms 
build-up are discussed, especially the cases of armament purchases in Brazil, 
Chile and Venezuela between 2003 and 2007, when the main weaponry pur-
chase contracts were signed. The third one, in the light of the empirical data 
and theoretical discussions questions the dual theses. In the final remarks 
one takes stock of the tensions in the dual theses on the South American arms 
build-up.
The Dualist Theses on Regional Security Systems in South 
America
Several theories of International Relations, be they of realist, institu-
tionalist or constructivist inspiration, agree that Latin America has a histor-
ical process of limited, or close to zero, military conflict. The classical realist 
perspective of security dilemmas had been absent from regional inter-state 
relations. This absence has been favored by the long periods when wars be-
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tween states disappear from the region’s military history and, above all, by 
the strong conviction of the political class that their neighbors are not threats 
to the existence of their states or that they do not modernize their military 
capabilities with offensive goals in mind. As Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas have 
pointed out, “Civilians do not believe that their neighbors are threats because 
history has shown that their neighbors rarely attack, so they pay little atten-
tion to defense policy and avoid strongly funding militaries”. (Pion-Berlin 
and Trinkunas 2007, 70). Added to this is the fact that although there are 
territorial disputes3, these do not seem sufficiently intense in South America 
to originate an inter-state security dynamic that would generate perceptions 
of threats as, for example the emergence of an expansionist State. There are 
no similarities between South American and European historic experiences 
regarding the emergence of expansionist states.
A variety of bibliographical production has advanced security analysis 
on South America based on the dichotomy of the Andean region (traditional 
security complex based on power policies) versus the Southern Cone (security 
community). Aligned with these analysis, Hirst (2006), commenting on the 
fragmentation of the security agenda in Latin America, has underlined the 
same dual vision of the South American complex when drawing attention to 
the fact that there are in South America an “[...] Andean sub-region weakened 
by the fragility of its state institutions and with few means to contain the 
push of drug trafficking and armed groups; and a pacific area in the Southern 
Cone committed to regional integration and mutual subregional confidence, 
particularly in the cases of Argentina and Brazil”. (Hirst 2006, 6). Bonilla and 
Cepik (2004, 86) have pointed out that in the “Subregional space, military 
and political issues are subject to very high securitization due to the character 
of the Colombian conflict and its evident regionalization [...]”.
Going even further than the realist perspectives, institutionalist – Eng-
lish School production, like that of Kakowicz (1998), has developed a thesis 
of the emergence, in South America as a whole, of a peace zone in which the 
South Cone’s cooperation has approached something similar to a pluralis-
tic community of security, or zone of peace, in which its member states no 
longer have expectations of resolving their conflicts through war. In the same 
direction, David Pion-Berlin (2000) has argued that the integration process 
of Mercosur has contributed to generate expectations of peaceful resolution 
of intra-state conflicts between members. A more nuanced view of this thesis 
has been developed by Hirst (1998) who, working from concepts of democrat-
ic peace and pluralistic security communities, has pointed to the conclusion 
3 At least until 2017,  five unresolved territorial disputes remained in South America (Bolivia-
Chile, Colombia-Venezuela, Guyana-Venezuela, Uruguay-Brazil, Colombia-Paraguay).
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that, “Democratization is an important but insufficient condition to inten-
sify cooperation in the Southern Cone […] In fact, security cooperation and 
democratization have not led to security integration, they have been effective 
in diminishing previous mistrust and animosity among Southern Cone so-
cieties and States – especially between Argentina and Brazil”. (Hirst, 1998). 
Within this same liberal perspective, the scarce inter-state conflicts 
in Latin America have also made the region a case for studies surrounding 
the theory of democratic peace. Dominguez’s work has reinforced the strong 
links between the strength of democratic institutions in the Southern Cone 
and the peace and security process that the subregion lives as a product of 
“democratic peace” (Dominguez 1998). Dominguez himself, working with 
Shifter in introducing the discussion on “post-consolidation” and “de-consol-
idation” points to the high fragilities and vulnerabilities of Andean democra-
cies (Dominguez and Shifter 2003).
In the empirical arena this type of argument has been reinforced by 
the emergence in the inter-American system of an institutional regime of 
democratic clauses, and even in some integration institutions such as Mer-
cosur. Also, Domingues’s (2007) liberal perspective has supported this same 
argument by emphasizing how firmly entrenched in Latin America’s inter-
national law is the legal principle of iutis possidettis iuris, whereby countries 
in the region concede that their limits and of its neighbors correspond, to a 
greater or lesser extent, to those of the era of political emancipation in the first 
decades of the 19th century.
Constructivist arguments in research such as that of Andrew Hur-
rel (1998) and Villa (2007) have also supported the idea of  a low propensity 
for conflict in the post-Cold War Southern Cone countries, pointing to the 
emergence, in both works, of a loose security community4, especially between 
Argentina and Brazil in the South American sub-region. For Hurrel, a fun-
damental aspect to be considered in the construction of this security com-
munity was the process of democratization in both countries. The process of 
redemocratization could have provided Argentina and Brazil with a common 
vision of interests and identities and, above all, made them understand the 
vulnerability and fragility of the redemocratization process and the impor-
4 In the definition of Karl Deustch (1957), or authors such as Adler & Barnett (1998), a security 
community is a transnational geographic space, contiguous or not, between states and whose 
societies have expectations that conflicts between them will be solved by peaceful means. The 
key point of a security community are the values  that the “community” shares, be they in a 
political, economic or cultural sense. Authors like Hurrel (1998) believe that in the Southern 
Cone a security community based on the re-democratization that has operated since the 
1980s is emerging. And Deustch (1957) himself believes that there is a North Atlantic security 
community based on liberal values and culture.
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tance of their joint defense. Thus, bilateral cooperation has come to play a role 
as a common shield against domestic threats to the process of redemocrati-
zation. Although these threats were greater in Argentina – where the military 
movement of Painted Faces attempted to break democratic institutionality in 
the late 1980s –, the Brazilian government realized that the maturing of de-
mocracy in the country depended heavily on the consolidation of democracy 
in neighboring Argentina. “Believing in redemocratization was important 
in redefining interests, identities, and a common sense of purpose” (Hurrel 
1998). In the same direction, but addressing the variable “impact of democ-
racy” on Brazilian foreign policy in relation to Argentina, Hurrel credits the 
institutionalization of a system of norms on disarmament and confidence 
building between Argentina and Brazil to the dismantling of geopolitical 
phantoms and the beginning of a cycle of military cooperation in the years 
of democratization. As a result, a successful set of self-governing norms and 
monitoring of the reciprocal mechanisms of Confidence Building Measures 
(CBMs) between both countries was created, which allowed for the stability 
and continuity of cooperative ventures. The institutionalization of military co-
operation agreements has included permanent exchanges between the staffs 
of the larger military states of the two countries and the continuation of bilat-
eral working groups on nuclear matters. The rules of mutual trust between 
the two countries also include the institutionalization of channels of commu-
nication between the presidents, senior officials (following the European path 
of the second post-Cold War period), consultations on participation in peace 
missions and the establishment of the triple frontier (Argentina-Brazil-Para-
guay) to deal with drug trafficking, smuggling and terrorism (Villa 2007). In 
the Brazil-Argentina case, actions have also included the joint development of 
the “Gaúcho” light combat vehicle for the Brazilian and Argentinean Armed 
Forces, which is in its final phase of operational evaluation by both countries, 
before the start of series production (Military Power Review 2008).
 An intermediate thesis is presented by Buzan & Waever (2003). 
These authors have supported the idea that in South America there are two 
well-differentiated subsystems of security: the Andean countries, with em-
phasis on the military aspect and territorial conflicts; and the Southern Cone, 
where there is a security community. Some situations of different preferences 
among the South American countries sometimes seem to come in support of 
the theoretical dichotomy of Buzan and Waever. At the Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS) Special Conference on Security in 2003, “when the solution 
adopted – the notion of multidimensional security5 – [South America] could 
5 One should remember that the OAS institutionalized the concept of multidimensional 
security that year. By this concept the organization assumes that the sources of threat to the 
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barely conceal the conceptual distance between, for example, the emphasis of 
Brazil and Argentina on poverty as a security threat and the much more tradi-
tional concerns of Ecuador and Venezuela with state military threats” (Cepik 
2005). This same thesis is supported by Monica Hirst (2003) to whom the 
two major developments in security and defense at the beginning of the new 
millennium in South America were the diversification of security options and 
priorities and the differentiated patterns of military evolution in the South 
Cone and the Andean region.
 In this way, International Relations theory has pointed in two direc-
tions: either South America as a peace zone, or a partial security community, 
or South America as a mixed region in which coexists a subregion more tied 
to traditional principles and another that sees the emergence of a weak secu-
rity community. Both views emphasize South American dislike for the violent 
resolution of conflicts and the attachment of the region to the principles of 
international law.
 But what happens when some of the states in South America began 
to carry out an armament build-up unusual to its security system in the first 
two decades of this century? In order to face this question, which will stress 
the thesis of duality in security and defense systems in South America, the 
armaments build-up is next presented. 
The Armaments Build-up in South America at the Beginning 
of the Millennium
Although it is not a theoretical argument, but an empirical one, the 
low military investment of South America has been used either to present the 
little concern of the political class with the re-armament and modernization 
of the South and Latin American armed forces; or as an argument to illustrate 
that South America is an atypical region, or exceptional in that military capa-
bilities or geographic proximity are not perceived with such concern among 
neighboring countries. Among the regions of the so-called periphery of the 
international system, the annual South American spending percentage is 
only superior to Central America (which has the lowest world spending) and 
Africa. It is important to realize, however, that South American spending is 
relatively low compared to other regions of the periphery of the international 
system, such as Asia and the Middle East. However, regional military spend-
states, governments and societies are plural: they can be military, but they can also come from 
hunger, poverty, natural disasters, climate change, terrorism, drug trafficking, international 
crime, corruption in national states, ethnic rivalries, and so on.
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ings fell between 2014 and 2016, and are
[…] 13 per cent lower compared to 2008, South American military spending 
grew by 4.1 per cent to $ 57.0 billion [between 2016-2017], the first annual 
rise since 2014, (by 15 per cent to $ 5.7 billion) and Brazil (by 6.3 per cent to 
$ 29.3 billion). The rise in military expenditure in South America between 
2016 and 2017 is mainly attributed to the increase by Argentina (by 15 per 
cent to $ 5.7 billion) and Brazil (by 6.3 per cent to $ 29.3 billion ). The in-
crease in Brazil’s military expenditure, the first annual increase since 2014 
and the largest since 2010, comes as a surprise given the country’s current 
largest since 2010, comes as a surprise given the country’s current eco-
nomic and political turmoil. However, in 2017 the Brazilian Government 
loosened its budget deficit targets to 2020 and released additional funds ($ 
4.1 billion) for all major sectors, including the military. for all major sectors, 
including the military. Venezuela, amid a year of social and political unrest, 
increased its military spending in 2017 by 19 per cent compared with 2016, 
since 2013. However, the ongoing economic crisis in the country meant 
that for all major sectors, including the military. military spending in 2017 
was still 75 per cent lower than in 2008.(Nam 2018, 4-5).
Latin American countries with the largest real increases in military 
spending in the period 2003-2007 all belong to South American: Venezuela 
(with 78.53%), Chile (53%) and Ecuador (49%). Also, in the region were the 
three countries with the highest military budgets: Brazil (accounting for 46% 
of expenditures, Colombia (accounting for 15%) and Chile (13%) (Stalenheim 
et al 2008, 200). Of the US$ 44 billion that Latin America invested in mili-
tary spending in 2007, only South American countries were responsible for 
US$ 39.6 billion.
Since 2005, Chile and Venezuela – and to a lesser extent, Brazil – 
have been the two countries that have increased the imports of arms in South 
America, raising the delicate question of whether the excessive concern to 
modernize the armed forces by these countries could be fueling an arms race 
in the region. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
released in mid-2008 the balance of the previous year, with regard to the ex-
ports, imports and transfer of arms around the world. In the medium-term 
analysis, SIPRI found a percentage increase in arms transfers to South Amer-
ica: “South American states accounted for 5% of the volume of international 
transfers of conventional arms imported for the period 2003-2007 – that is, 
47% higher than in 1998-2002” (Holtom et al 2006). 
The increase coincides with the fact that between 2004 and 2006 
South America had three consecutive years of strong economic growth (grow-
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ing at an average rate of approximately 5.3%) (ECLAC 2006) something that 
was not recorded since the 1970s when growth was close to average rates of 
7.0%. Although growth in South America dropped to 4.9% in 2007, some 
of its strongest economies, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, 
respectively, maintained growth dynamics at rates of 8.7%, 5.3%, 5.1% and 
8.4%,6 respectively. On the other hand, economic growth was accompanied 
by improvements in the main macroeconomic indicators in almost all the 
countries of the region (inflation, fiscal adjustment and reduction of public 
debt – and even some sources have interpreted the increase in South Ameri-
can military spendings in the last five years as a result of economic growth; a 
weak dollar, that stimulates different types of imports; and the political will to 
modernize the Armed Forces of the region, which are largely confronted with 
the obsolescence of armaments inventories (IISS, 2008, 59).
 Could such acquisitions be transforming South America into an 
emerging market for sales of sophisticated conventional weapons? For ex-
ample, in the case of Chile, in short-term analysis the country appears as the 
main South American arms importer of Great Britain, occupying in 2007 the 
second place in its global exports of armaments to the world, tied with Roma-
nia – for both countries the United Kingdom exported 9%, only lower than 
the 17% it exported to the United States market. The dynamism of imports of 
Chilean armaments was reflected in the fact that the military budget grew by 
23% in 2007 (Ibid 60-61). Venezuela was, in 2007, the third largest market 
for arms exports from Russia to the world (with 5% of total Russian exports, 
although this percentage is well below the 45% Russia exports to China and 
the 22% exported to the Indian market (Ibid). “Not surprisingly, arms export-
ing countries – Russia in particular – have pointed out that with economic 
success and the aging of Latin America, its markets offer relevant opportuni-
ties for the sales of new military equipment” (ibid. 59).
In the Andean security sub-complex, the case that has attracted the 
most attention, however, is that of Venezuela. Although some sources ac-
knowledge that until 2006 Venezuela was not the main investor in arms in 
the region (Latin America Security & Strategic Rewiev 2006, 1-2), the fact is 
that “Venezuela has dramatically increased its arms imports from position 
56 in the period 1998-2002 to the 24th position in the period 2003-2007 as 
the largest regional importer”. (SIPRI 2007). Only in 2007 did Venezuela 
6 Estado de São Paulo Online, “PIB da Argentina cresceu 8,7% em 2007, diz Cristina Kirchner”, 
12 feb. 2008,  available at <http://www.estadao.com.br/economia/not_eco122970,0.htm>, 
consulted in 27/08/2008; Dinheirama, “Alta do PIB, a Selic e o crescimento do Brasil”, 
available at <http://dinheirama.com/blog/2008/03/14/alta-do-pib-a-selic-e-o-crescimento-do-
brasil/>, accessed 27/08/2017.
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increase its defense budget by 78% (reaching US$ 887 million), becoming 
the largest spender in real terms in South America that year (Holtom et al., 
2008). Although the amount of arms imports is lower than that of Chile for 
the period 2003-2007 (US$ 1.417 billion from Venezuela versus US$ 2.283 
billion from Chile), oil prices are steadily rising for several years, the presi-
dential will to improve military capabilities of the country and the search for 
improvement in the Venezuelan regional political position have led the coun-
try to increasing its military budget.  It should be noted that Venezuela has 
been consolidating, over the years, a tendency that shows Russia as the main 
supplier of armaments. Thus in the period 2003-2007 Russia supplied 93% 
of the arms purchased by Venezuela, while China supplied 3% and Israel 2% 
(Ibid 306). This may explain why, in 2006 and 2007, Venezuela ranked 8th 
and 4th among the developing countries that received the most arms deliver-
ies and that signed arms transfer agreements the most (IISS 2008, 449). Ven-
ezuelan governments also have legal mechanisms to allow additional funds 
to be added to the military budget in the fiscal year. The main mechanism is 
the so-called Lei Paraguas (Umbrella Law), which allows the government to 
negotiate external loans to finance extra military spending, not always includ-
ed in the original military budget, although the Venezuelan government has 
announced its intention to use this less frequently and even eliminate such 
mechanism (Ibid 2008).
In the Southern Cone subsystem, Chile is the country that stands out 
in its efforts to acquire modern technology weapons to (re)capitalize on its 
armed forces. In the period 2003-2007, Chile became the largest importer 
of conventional weapons in South America. The country ranked 36th in the 
world ranking of recipients of armaments in the period between 1998 and 
2002, and in the period 2003-2007 it became the 12th position (the first po-
sition among Latin American countries) (Holtom et al., 2008, 305 ). Chile 
has also been the only Latin American country capable of maintaining a mili-
tary expenditure/Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio above 3.5% throughout 
this first decade of the 21st century, with the exception of 2007, when it was 
exceeded in real expenditures by Venezuela, by approximately US$ 2, 109 
billion.
This constant level of spending was possible due to two factors: first, 
because Chile has performed very well in recent years. For example, between 
2004 and 2007 the Chilean GDP grew at an annual average rate of 6.2%. Sec-
ond, the Chilean armed forces continue to benefit from the permanence of 
the Copper Law that dates back to the 1950s7 and was modified in the days of 
7 In fact, the Copper Law (Ley del Cobre) dates from 1958, but it was modified in 1998, still 
during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.
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the military government of Augusto Pinochet, whereby 10% of copper exports 
were directed to finance operational military expenditures and equipment 
purchases8. The fact is that Chile is the main world exporter of copper and the 
international prices of this commodity have had a very high increase in recent 
years9. For many years the Copper Law contributed an annual average of US$ 
200 million per year to the military budget but, due to the unprecedented 
increase in international prices, the Law would be responsible for financing 
alone almost US$ 1 billion, which led to strong pressures from Chile’s politi-
cal and social sectors to revise or extinguish the law.
Brazil represents a transversal State, or bridge, between the two South 
American security subsystems. Although in the medium term Brazil had not 
shown the same level of spending, in comparative terms of GDP, as Venezue-
la and Chile, any inclination in terms of military expenditures must include 
Brazil, due to the greater complexity of its economy, the fact that it repre-
sents half of the region’s GDP (around 56%), and the greater complexity of 
its regional and global policies. It is true that between 2003 and 2007 Brazil 
reduced its international weight as an importer of conventional armaments – 
from position 32 in the period 1998-2002 it fell to position 33 – this decrease 
was offset by the important increase of the military budget in 2007 by more 
than 33%, which was by far the most important change in a decade. This ex-
plains why Brazil ranked 14th among the countries with the highest military 
spending until 2006, moving to the 12th place in 2007 (Stepanova 2008, 12).
8 According to The Economist, the money allocated for the “Ley del Cobre” concept has already 
brought to Chile 340 tanks from Germany, eight frigates, two new submarines and 28 F-16 
fighter jets. See The economist, “South America defense: speak fraternally but carry a stick”, 
05/29/2008.
9 Chile is the world’s largest copper producer – with 25% of the world’s production – and 
by 2005 the mining industry will contribute US$ 6.1 billion to the country, or about 25% of 
total tax revenues expected by 2005, a number that may be higher today because international 
copper prices, which averaged US$ 1.7 a pound that year, doubled as of 2006, and continued 
to grow in 2007. In addition, international copper price growth had a significant impact 
on the economies of other South American producers, mainly Peru, and to a lesser extent 
Argentina and Brazil. For this information consult: : UniversiaKnowledge@Warten, “Preços 
do cobre aliviam cofres da América latina”, 21/09/2005, <http://wharton.universia.net/index.
cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=1028&language=portuguese&specialId>, consulted in 05/09/2008 
; Último Segundo, ”Com preço maior, roubo de cobre no Brasil cresce 11% 2em 2007”, 
06/05/2008, <http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/brasil/2008/05/06/com_preco_maior_
roubo_de_cobre_no_brasil_cresce_11_em_2007_1300233.html>, accessed 05/09/2008.
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However, we must pay attention to the fact that Brazilian military ex-
penditures of almost US$ 70 billion in the period 2003-2007 is diluted in the 
size of its economy, whose GDP reached close to R$ 2,5 trillion (or US$ 1.5 
trillion) in 2007 (IBGE 2008). As a result, in the military expenditure/GDP 
ratio, Brazil is a country that spends little when compared to Colombia or 
Chile, and only slightly more than Argentina and Peru (see graph above). In 
the period 2003-2007, Brazil spent an average of 1.5% of its GDP on military 
expenditures. However, it should be borne in mind that, although the defense 
budget increased by an average of 15% between 2004 and 2007 – and despite 
the 33% of 2007 – only 4% of the budget is available for investment in new ac-
quisitions and weaponry upgrade. The remainder of the military budget sheet 
is spent primarily on staff pay, including military retirement and pension ex-
penses. In this way, the actual expenditure of US$ 818 million in purchases 
and upgrades of arms in the period 2003-2007 was lower than those of Chile 
and Venezuela.
Between 2003 and 2007 Brazil imported most of its armament from 
the European Union (64%), followed by the United States (17%) and Canada 
(7%) (Holtom et al 2008), and the imports of these and other countries is 
mainly possible through the purchase plans of the Navy and the Aeronautics. 
Some analysis have suggested that Brazil, like Chile, has given preference 
to Western suppliers, especially those belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and not to Russia or China, not by chance, but by a ra-
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tionality that involves a “strategic choice”: in its emergence, the South Amer-
ican regional power does not predict a relationship of rivalry with the West 
(Stratfor 2008), but rather a partnership for its plans to develop an important 
role in regional security. This spending evolution is expected to be completed 
by the signing, in 2013, of the super modern Swedish fighter Griphen, thus 
concretely starting the largest modernization program of the Brazilian armed 
forces.
Empirical and Conceptual Tensions Putting Pressure in the 
Dualistic Perspectives
How have the analysis reacted to this increase in the South Ameri-
can arms build-up? The truth is that analysis that are more realistic, whether 
they are academically elaborated or of a conjunctural nature, have strongly 
recovered, at least until 2011, the idea of  the vitality, and even a certain dyna-
mism of perceptions of threats between neighboring states, especially Chile 
and Venezuela. Thus, in recent years, it has been heard with some frequency 
that Latin America, and especially South America, would be entering an arms 
race. Frequent media reports and strong statements by political figures have 
fueled these fears10. Also, some academic production has come to the same 
conclusion, as Malamud and Garcia argue: “The famous arms race in Latin 
America, led by Venezuela, is no longer just a speech” (Malamud and Gar-
cia 2006). However, this argument does not seem very consistent: “[...] It is 
doubtful that events in the region can be described exactly as an ‘arms race’ 
in classical terms. Acquisitions have been primarily motivated by efforts to 
replace or upgrade military capabilities in order to maintain existing capabili-
ties; respond to major threats to domestic security; strengthen links with sup-
plier governments; boost the domestic military industry; participate in peace 
missions; or improve the international or regional profile of the country”. 
(Holtom et al., 2008, 305).
One result of this type of analysis is that there is, in principle, a re-
covery of the state as a strong security actor; secondly, analysis based on the 
conceptual assumptions of security communities and democratic peace, and 
even those that, as Buzan and Weaver (2003), visualize a mixed regional se-
curity system – a traditional half in the Andean countries and a security com-
10 By the end of 2006, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, in reaction to arms purchases 
by countries such as Venezuela and Chile said the region was entering an “arms race”. See 
for journalistic references: Downie, Andrew, Time World, “A South American Arms Race?”, 
Friday, december 21, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1697776,00.html; 
accessed 23/07/2017.
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munity in the Southern Cone.
However, the realistic dramatization of the arms race in South Ameri-
ca from the beginning of this century was important because it identified and 
recognized certain difficulties, images and mistrust among South American 
States arising from the upgrade and recapitalization cycle of the military park. 
Above all, as a conceptual result, it questions the dualistic assumption of the 
Andean subsystem (traditional security relations) versus the Southern Cone 
(security community).
Constructivist and liberal studies have tensioned this dual perspective 
given the political conditions in which the build-up occurs: in the first decade 
of this century there was a group of countries that intended to improve their 
position and regional and global political profile, regardless of their regional 
sub-complex – Andean region or the Southern Cone – especially Brazil and 
Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent, Chile. In this sense, two options appear: to 
modernize their military capabilities and to strengthen strategic partnerships 
with governments seen as global suppliers of advanced military equipment.
In this sense, there is a political condition that feeds the arms build-up 
of the South American security system which has little to do with strictly tra-
ditional concerns, understood as military ones. The South American regional 
security system has been going through a new phase in which broader politi-
cal and military objectives shift traditional concerns. These new objectives are 
related to the improvement of the regional and even global political position 
of some South American countries especially Brazil, Chile and Venezuela. 
Certainly, there are domestic motivations that also encourage the build-up 
in the case of these three countries. However, both the domestic security 
goals arising from the build-up and the regional policy goals, by their latent 
nature are not explicit, they generate fears in several neighboring countries. 
Being in the presence of the classical problem of information asymmetry, 
poor communication, and even the low institutionalization of trust measures 
between actors, creates conditions for the resurgence of distrust, which fuels 
false representations of facts or misrepresentation of neighbors in relation 
to the countries leading the build-up. And given that the three State actors 
that are the source of these false representations are located throughout the 
South American region, we question the dualistic theoretical fragmentation 
that sees a more traditional subsystem of security in the Andean countries 
and a security community in the Southern Cone.
In this logic of regional and global ambitions in the Chilean military 
build-up, regional goals and motivations are present. One motivation of the 
Chilean governments, as well as the high military command, is the transfor-
mation of Chile into a regional military power capable of achieving, by the 
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end of this decade, what is technically known as “NATO military standard” 
(Gonzales 2005), status not reached by any South American country until our 
days. During the period 2003-2007 Chile’s main import markets for arms 
were the European Union with 82%, the United States with 15% and Israel 
with 3% (Ibid). This choice of Western, or with strong ties to the West, coun-
tries as suppliers could be related to the fact that, as some analysis suggest, 
Chile has ambitions to acquire that military status (Ibid).
 However, Chile’s participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeep-
ing missions has also been highlighted as one of the main reasons for the 
modernization of the Armed Forces and the investment in the purchase of 
military equipment. Chile, which until 1990 had participated in only three 
UN peacekeeping missions, has increased its participation to 15, and is the 
only South American country since 1996 to have a “State [Chilean] policy for 
participation in peace operations”(Ramirez 2007).
Also, in Venezuela’s case strategic motivations have been present in 
arms purchases: the improvement of the country’s regional political position. 
The Venezuelan government believes in the possibility of Venezuela’s lead-
ership in South America. One way to improve the political position towards 
this goal is to improve military capabilities and the regional influence that 
comes from that. Improving military capabilities in order to improve its re-
gional political position vis-à-vis competitors with the Brazilian dimension 
has also been linked to the strengthening ties with Russia. Some analysts 
believe that if the alliance between Venezuela and Russia bothers the United 
States, the modernization of the Venezuelan arsenal also displeases Brazil, 
not so much for the military threat itself, but for the political improvement of 
the Venezuelan position in the much-speculated dispute for the South Amer-
ican leadership between both countries11. Thus, it is argued that Brazil, as well 
as Chile, would be preparing a strategy to reduce the influence that Venezuela 
has acquired in relation to some South American countries (Latin America 
Security & Strategic Review, 2007). Chile would be indifferent to the fact that 
the Venezuelan government would be trying to transform Venezuela into a 
regional power since the country would at present have the capacity to reach 
this condition considering the high foreign exchange derived from the oil 
sales12.
11 “Hugo Chavez achète de nouvelles armes en Russie”, Le Figaro, 24/7/2008, <http://www.
lefigaro.fr/international/2008/07/24/01003-20080724ARTFIG00004-hugo-chavez-achete-
de-nouvelles-armesen-russie-.php>, consulted in 13/8/2009; see also, BBC-Brasil, “Compra de 
armas da Venezuela causa ‘inveja’ ao Brasil”, 24/7/2008, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/
reporterbbc/story/2008/07/080724_pressvenezuela_pu.shtml>, accessed 13/01/2018.
12 “Chávez busca ‘armas e liderança’ em Moscou”, BBC-Brasil, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/
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In Brazil, on the other hand, the modernization plans of the Brazilian 
Armed Forces raise certain warnings in some sectors of neighboring coun-
tries regarding the possibility of Brazil following the same route of Chile and 
Venezuela (Gosman 2007). Like most South American countries, one reason 
strongly given for the purchase of new armaments is the technological lag of 
the Armed Forces, especially the Air Force. To bring the Armed Forces up to 
date, especially the Aeronautics, super-modern French Rafale fighter planes 
would need to be bought.
But in fact, the project of modernizing Brazilian Armed Forces over-
comes possible concerns with the modernization of those of any neighboring 
country. The great Brazilian motivation is more strongly related to its pro-
jection as a hemispheric and global Brazil, that is, the adequacy of Brazil to 
its emergent global political player position (emergent global political actor). 
Analysis have drawn attention to the fact that although Venezuelan purchases 
have received more attention (mainly by the “Chavez factor”), Brazil is the only 
South American country with the capacity to make a long-term investment. 
“Brazil is better positioned to start a constant arms build-up supported by its 
own domestic industry [...]. The choice of the three [airline companies], sig-
nificantly two from NATO countries [and one that could become a member] 
suggests a point of crucial importance on the way Brazil views its future. De-
spite the changing geopolitical realities in the world, Brazil in its emergence 
to a regional prominence in the next decade does not seem to foresee greater 
conflicts or even a relationship of rivalry with the West” (Stratfor 2008).
Perhaps in this context of regional and global motivations can be un-
derstood the elaboration of the Strategic Plan of National Defense. In Septem-
ber 2007 President Lula, avoiding referring to any motivation that had to do 
with Venezuela, or any other South American country, announced the crea-
tion of a working group, under the direction of the Ministry of Defense and 
coordinated by the intellectual Mangabeira Unger, to formulate the guidelines 
of a plan for the modernization of the Armed Forces (National Defense Strate-
gic Plan, or Growth Acceleration Plan in Defense – PAC in Defense, as it has 
also been called, that takes into account three general and five concrete objec-
tives. The first refers to: 1) the review of defense strategies; 2) reactivation of 
the domestic arms industry; 3) autonomy of defense policy. The concrete con-
cerns are addressed to answer the following questions: 1) which are the best 
strategies for times of peace and war; 2) organization of the Armed Forces, 
endowed with the technological and operational vanguard; 3) reactivation of 
the national armaments industry, directed to the goal of autonomy in defense; 




4) identification of the Armed Forces with the nation, especially regarding 
borders defense, where the Amazon appears as a priority, compulsory mili-
tary service and social tasks; 5) establishment of lines for the Armed Forces in 
situations of order and rule of law13.
The armament build-up in South America, however, also tensioned 
middle-ground analysis, such as that based on the regional security complex-
es of Buzan and Waever (2003). The South American arms build-up reveals 
tensions between a movement that pulls toward traditional (neo)security as-
sets, seeking broader political goals through military means – in cases such 
as Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela –, as we explored in the previous section, and 
another that seeks to generate a certain social capital through the design of 
CBMs. However, both movements are not geographically limited, as the anal-
ysis of regional security complexes implies. That is, it is not only the Andean 
region that behaves in a neo-traditional way, nor is it just in the Southern 
Cone where the CBMs are present. What we have here called neo-traditional 
behaviors are present in Andean countries, such as Venezuela, and are also 
welcomed in Southern Cone countries, such as Brazil and Chile. The same 
can be said of the CBMs, they are contiguous, in the sense that they cross both 
geographical spaces. Although it should be recognized that levels of adop-
tion and application of CBMs are unequal, with the Southern Cone having a 
stronger participation in those than the Andean region (Holtom 2008, 305).
The previous can be illustrated by the reactions generated by arms 
modernization in sectors of Peru and Bolivia. In a typical problem of misrep-
resentation, the purchase of modern military equipment by Chile has raised 
hypotheses in Peruvian and Bolivian political and academic sectors that the 
modernization of Chilean Armed Forces would have the immediate conse-
quence of opening a wide gap in the quality, sophistication and available tech-
nology of the Chilean arsenal in comparison to the first ones. Chilean military 
spending has also been particularly concerned with Peru and Bolivia, with 
which Chile still has territorial disputes that date back to the end of the 19th 
century and are very sensitive to all of them. According to a study by Carlos 
Gutiérrez, “[...] the evidences that demonstrate Chile’s military spending and 
the acquisition of modern weapons systems have been a determining factor 
in the neighbors type of arms race, which would bring back the ghosts of 
historical conflicts (Gutierrez 2007, 309). However, it is the scarcity of ac-
curate exchange of information that leads to this kind of image (fear). Even 
the possibility of using the modernization of Chilean stocks for potential set-
tlements in border contentious can eventually create burdens for Chile and 
13 For all these inquiries, see “Lula launches preparations for superpower status”, Latin America 
Security & Strategic Review (2007). 
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other countries. Arms suppliers may refuse to sell because it is unclear to 
them whether their sales can generate conditions for future regional conflicts 
or more structural problems such as regional military imbalance. In 2005, 
for example, Switzerland canceled the sale to Chile of 93 modern Leopard II 
tanks (later bought from Germany) and some sources suggest that the reason 
for this was the Swiss government’s distrust regarding the real Chilean moti-
vation for such purchases14.
In the case of Chile and Peru, that dispute maritime areas since the 
late 19th century, as sustained by a work of Farih Kahhat, although the advanc-
es in cooperation between the two countries, a certain mistrust persist and is 
fed in reserved official documents in which are projected (unofficial) hypothe-
ses based on inaccurate information or incoherent arguments (Kahhat 2006).
However, from Chile’s side, there has been an effort to improve the 
quality of information through the construction of security regimes (CBMs) 
with their Peruvian and Bolivian neighbors given the concerns raised by the 
increase in arms purchases. Especially after the Chilean acquisition of the 
F-16 fighter planes (Higuera 2005), at the beginning of this decade, the ten-
sions derived from this fact were alleviated by the beginning of trust-gener-
ating agreements. During the governments of Ricardo Lagos in Chile and 
Alejandro Toledo, in Peru, tensions and suspicions increased sharply, but 
were attenuated from the beginning of the second government of Peruvian 
President Allan Garcia. The CBM measures between Chile and Peru have in-
cluded meetings among defense ministers, trying to reactivate a mechanism 
called the 2 + 2 Meeting, which is a permanent commission for consultation, 
policy coordination and information exchange, which includes the ministries 
of defense and Foreign Affairs of both countries, whose activities had been 
suspended since the time of Alejandro Toledo (Latin America Security & Stra-
tegic Review 2007, 9).
Regarding Chile-Bolivia relations – which have been frozen for several 
years in this decade and despite tense bilateral declarations at the beginning 
of the Evo Morales administration – there have been great improvements 
since 2007 and a series of CBMs were announced by the governments of both 
countries, including the destruction of landmines that Chile disseminated 
in the years of Pinochet dictatorship along the border with Bolivia, as well as 
the sending of Bolivian soldiers to Chile to be trained in: 1) mine activities; 2) 
exchange of Bolivian students in Chilean military academies; (3) permanent 
consultation mechanisms and anti-drug cooperation efforts (Ibid, 9).
14 “Chile teme que conflicto con Perú afecte compra de armas”,  22/11/2005, <http://www.
gatoencerrado.net/store/noticias/35/35249/detalle.htm>, consulted in 22/9/2017.
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In both South American geographic spaces, the possibilities of an 
arms race are attenuated by formal and informal confidence-building meas-
ures (CBMs), which have played an important role in reducing the impact of 
arms procurement in South America (Holtom et al 2008 304-305) or atten-
uating the deepening of conflicts arising from border disputes that have not 
yet been resolved. The CBMs aim to create transparency, monitoring mech-
anisms in military procedures and operations, reduce asymmetries of infor-
mation among member states of a regime of rules in the treatment of security 
and disarmament problems15. If armament purchases suggest a movement 
towards (neo)traditional patterns in the South American system – since they 
stimulate eventual and historical “enmity” – this movement is problematized, 
or somewhat attenuated, by patterns of “friendship” based on the search for 
CBMs, which generate conditions for the stretching of the weak security com-
munity, in the sense described by some theorists (Adler and Barnet 1998) of 
the security community, specifically in the countries of the Southern Cone 
such as Argentina and Brazil (Oelsner 2009).
Final Remarks
Returning to the theoretical argument, the analysis that we had been 
defined as dual, argue that South America has two different security sub-
systems: one of the Andean countries (with emphasis on the military aspect 
and in territorial conflicts), and another in the Southern Cone, where there 
is the emergence of a security community. Analysis such as those made by 
Hirst (2006) have argued that the two major developments in security and 
defense at the beginning of the new millennium in South America were the 
diversification of security options and priorities and differentiated patterns of 
military evolution in the Southern Cone and the Andean region. On the oth-
er hand, analysis based on concepts of security community and democratic 
peace have emphasized the development, in the Southern Cone, of commu-
nities of values  and the impact of the democratic nature of their political sys-
tems in the consolidation of cooperative relations. However, South American 
military expenditures for the 2003-2007 five-year period show that there are 
no two complexes in the strict sense. Regional and global goals of countries 
such as Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, which are goals of a political rather than 
military nature, however, suffer from the problem of misrepresentation, since 
15 Regarding CBMs in Latin America see the excellent work of Bromley, M. & Perdomo (2005), 
C. “CBMs in Latin America and the effect of the arms acquisition by Venezuela”, Working 
Paper 41/2005. Available at <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/216.asp>, 
accessed in 05/09/2008.
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it is not clear to some of their neighboring states what are the motivations be-
hind their build-up. Thus, what for Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela could appear 
as political goals are interpreted as traditional goals by neighbors, or even 
among them, as in the case of Brazil-Venezuela. That is, reflecting on events, 
misrepresentation is common to the South American complex as a whole. 
While it is correct to say that South America has built a historic zone 
of peace, if it is understood by that the absence of wars, or few wars since 
the formation of the modern system of South American states, it is also true 
that dualistic analysis have provided little attention to the problems stemming 
from information scarcity in the South American build-up process, which has 
the consequence of increasing fears about intentions, capacities and actions 
projected on state actors. Somehow this draws attention to the precariousness 
of CBMs, the main tool of security regimes in South America, through which 
it is possible to take “accurate information to calm false rumors” (Lindle, 
2007, p. 1), which allow reciprocal knowledge of the actors and their inten-
tions among themselves. CBMs have played an important role in mitigating 
the impact of the acquisition of arms in South America (Holtom et al., 2008, 
304-305) or of mitigating conflicts arising from unresolved border disputes.
More than an arms race, almost all South American countries began 
a recapitalization of their obsolete military inventory, dating mostly from 
the 1950s and 1960s, and the most modern ones from the 1980s. At the 
beginning of the millennium, this re-capitalization means an upgrade and 
replacement of military equipment (Hodge, 2008). However, there is much 
asymmetry in re-capitalization. Chile and Venezuela have benefited from two 
conditions. First, there is a strong tendency in both countries to use their ex-
port commodities (oil and copper) to finance military spending and support 
their plans for modernizing the Armed Forces; second, both countries rely 
on original extra-budgetary mechanisms (Chile’s Copper Law, Paraguayan 
Umbrella Law) to finance military spending, such that the original military 
budget for each fiscal year rarely coincides with real military spending; the 
end of the economic crises in Latin America between the years 1997 and 
2000 also provided financial conditions for the re-emergence of projects to 
modernize the armed forces (Martin 2006, p.3). In such a way that re-capi-
talization, in the form of upgrades or new purchases, regardless of actual or 
latent motivations, can be considered as a sign of resumption and normali-
zation of civil-military relations in South America. In Brazil, the purchase of 
the Griphen fighters constitutes the highest point of that recapitalization and 
modernization of arms.
 Although there are possible pressures arising from the correlation 
that some neighboring countries to Chile and Venezuela can make between 
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arms modernization and border disputes or historical rivalries, fundamen-
tally the build-up seeks to improve the position and regional political pro-
file, especially in Brazil, which has more global objectives among the South 
American countries, and Venezuela, with its commitment to build a space 
for its regional leadership. In this sense, two paths appear as fundamental to 
achieving these goals: modernizing their military capabilities and strength-
ening strategic ties and partnerships with governments as global suppliers 
of advanced military equipment. Even so, there is no necessary relationship 
between political objectives and military conditions. The case of Chile illus-
trates this well: even with an accelerated modernization of its Armed Forces, 
which has included strong purchases of sophisticated weapons, its political 
objectives for regional leadership are very limited and discrete.
 However, a unique theoretical consequence of the South American 
arms build-up is that it also puts pressure in conceptual contributions that 
separate the two South American subsystems. As most of these dual analysis 
are based on a relationship between the nature of the political system (the 
impact of domestic redemocratization especially, which is quite clear in the 
case of liberal and constructivist analysis) and a type of cooperative security 
relationship that tends to derive from the democratic nature of the system, 
they lead not only to a securitization of relations in the Andean regional sub-
complex, but also tend to empty the democratic agenda as a tool for security 
and foreign policy. The truth is that by splitting the South American system, 
that type of analysis does not realize that the debate on this item is all over the 
South America “For these reasons the changes that happened beginning in 
the late 1980s and that have continued in the 21st century are truly remarka-
ble. In a little more than a decade, democracy has gone from being an internal 
matter to a subject of intense deliberation in regional forums” (Arceaneaux 
and Pion-Berlin 2005, 87).
 In fact, if we look at the contemporary South American arms build-
up, there are characteristics in common with both geographic spaces that, 
instead of fragmenting them theoretically, end up giving them certain conti-
guity. Both spaces have actors concerned with military goals; although these 
goals do not have strong traditional ambitions; in both spaces, State actors 
that have deepened the modernization of their Armed Forces – Chile and 
Venezuela – however, eventually raise concerns among neighbors, due to per-
ceptions of threats that go back to the past; both security subsystems have 
developed CBMs with their neighbors, although it may be stressed that these 
are more consistent in the Southern Cone than in the Andean region. The 
difference between South American security subsystems seems to be more 
related to political stability than to regional security aspects. Certainly, the 
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Andean subsystem, since the 1990s, shows a greater degree of political insta-
bility than political systems of the Southern Cone. 
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ABSTRACT
Research that focuses on security systems in South America usually identifies the 
existence of two regional security subsystems: one in the Andean countries of the 
North, with more traditional characteristics such as militarized tensions at the bor-
ders and intense drug trafficking problems; and a second one located in the Southern 
Cone, with security and integration regimes, which could qualify as a security com-
munity. This is what we call a dualistic view of security. This paper challenges this 
thesis to show that contemporary developments and concerns about the purchase of 
sophisticated weaponry by some South American countries, especially Chile, Vene-
zuela, and Brazil in the first two decades of this century are critical points for the idea 
of  a permanent (democratic) peace zone located only in the Southern Cone. In fact, 
arms purchases transform the South American region into a single regional security 
complex with tensions and militarized representations in both the Andean system 
and the Southern Cone.
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